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Abstract  1 
A heterogeneous private sector dominates healthcare provision in many middle-income 2 
countries. In India the contemporary period has seen this sector undergo corporatisation 3 
processes characterised by emergence of large private hospitals and the takeover of 4 
medium-sized and charitable hospitals by corporate entities. Little is known about the 5 
operations of these private providers and the effects on healthcare professions as 6 
employment shifts from practitioner-owned small and medium hospitals to larger corporate 7 
settings. This article uses data from a mixed-methods study in two large cities in 8 
Maharashtra, India, to consider the implications of these contemporary changes for the 9 
medical profession. Data were collected from semi-structured interviews with 43 10 
respondents who have detailed knowledge of healthcare in Maharashtra, and from a 11 
witness seminar on the topic of transformation in Maharashtra’s healthcare system. 12 
Transcripts from the interviews and witness seminar were analysed thematically through a 13 
combination of deductive and inductive approaches. Our findings point to a restructuring of 14 
medical practice in Maharashtra as training shifts towards private education and 15 
employment to those corporate hospitals. The latter is fuelled by substantial personal 16 
indebtedness, dwindling appeal of government employment, reduced opportunities to work 17 
in smaller private facilities, and the perceived benefits of work in larger providers. We 18 
describe a ‘re-professionalisation’ of medicine encompassing changes in employment 19 
relations, performance targets and constraints placed on professional autonomy within the 20 
private healthcare sector, that is accompanied by trends in cost inflation, medical 21 
malpractice, and distrust in doctor-patient relationships. The accompanying ‘re-22 
stratification’ within this part of the profession affords prestige and influence to ‘star 23 
doctors’ while eroding the status and opportunity for young and early career doctors. The 24 
research raises important questions about the role that government and medical 25 
professionals’ bodies can, and should, play in contemporary transformation of private 26 
healthcare, and the implications of these trends for health systems more broadly.   27 
 28 
Key questions  29 
 30 
What is already known? 31 
• There is an expanding and diverse private healthcare sector in many low- and 32 
middle-income country settings, however structural changes and resultant practices 33 
within the sector are poorly documented  34 
• Many parts of India have a burgeoning corporate healthcare sector and its growth 35 
has been accompanied by growing concerns about cash-for-referral practices, over-36 
testing and over-treatment, and also violence against healthcare professions. 37 
 38 
What are the new findings?  39 
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• Employment in larger facilities, notably corporate hospitals, is taking over from 1 
earlier models of employment for doctors in Maharashtra such as government 2 
employment and doctor-owner facilities 3 
• This is accompanied by changes in employment relations and widespread use of 4 
performance targets, which place new constraints on professional autonomy, 5 
particularly for early career doctors.  6 
• Doctors and other respondents report that these changes are accompanied by the 7 
inflated cost of healthcare, and exacerbate medical malpractice and distrust in 8 
doctor-patient relationships 9 
What do the new findings imply? 10 
• Governments and medical professionals’ bodies must pay attention to ongoing 11 
structural changes in the private healthcare sector, the growth of corporate ways of 12 
working, and the implications for medical practices and standards. 13 
 14 
  15 
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Introduction 1 
 2 
‘Perhaps the most subtle loss of autonomy for the profession will take place because of 3 
increasing corporate influence over the rules and standards of medical work.’ [1] 4 
 5 
Starr’s prediction referred to a transformation of healthcare that was in process in the USA 6 
in the 1980s, but as corporate organisations now are becoming increasingly visible players in 7 
healthcare systems in middle-income countries, his statement invites investigation in these 8 
new settings. In this article we examine the contemporary experiences of doctors in India as 9 
they encounter these new forms of commercialised healthcare delivery in the large cities, 10 
and consider the implications these have for their work and for the Indian medical 11 
profession.  12 
 13 
In the latest phase of commercialisation of healthcare, development finance and private 14 
equity investments have together fuelled the growth of corporate hospitals in low- and 15 
middle-income countries (LMICs). [2-6] Large multi- and super-specialty private hospitals 16 
offer a new model of care provision but beyond that, as we argue in detail elsewhere, 17 
corporate ways of working also impact upon the management and operation of medium-18 
scale hospitals and charitable trust hospitals within the private provision sector. [7] In line 19 
with the global push to expand the healthcare industry supported by the World Bank’s 20 
International Finance Corporation and other development financing institutions, healthcare 21 
is being viewed as providing potentially lucrative business opportunities.[8] However, a 22 
recent Lancet series highlighted how little is known about the operation of private providers 23 
and the difficulty in assessing their effects on healthcare.[9-10] 24 
 25 
This re-orientation of healthcare also has significant implications for the working lives of 26 
those in the workforce of healthcare organisations. Various writers on transformation in the 27 
private healthcare sector have recommended more research on its effects on doctors and 28 
on medical practice.[11-14] The literature on the effects of healthcare corporatisation on 29 
employment practices in high income countries emerged in the 1970s and 1980s[1,11, 15-30 
16] and has been subject to renewed interest in the last few years.[17]  31 
 32 
Research in LMICs has centred on the effects of private sector growth, including physicians’ 33 
views on the risks and benefits of the private healthcare sector in Vietnam and Ethiopia.[18-34 
19]. In India there have been claims that recent transformations in the private healthcare 35 
sector are encouraging the retention of health workers within the country [20-21], yet 36 
others point to incentives for medical malpractice. [20, 22-24] There are concerns regarding 37 
erosion of status for the medical profession as medical students and recent graduates face a 38 
series of challenges to complete their studies and find work, including indebtedness and the 39 
pressures of finding work in highly competitive fields [21, 25-26], and senior doctors have 40 
noted the need for stronger support from medical associations for doctors working in the 41 
5 
 
private healthcare sector. [22] Wilson’s ethnographic study in the south Indian state of 1 
Kerala situates these challenges within a broader social transformation in which there 2 
appears to be a widening gulf between the high social status ascribed to the medical 3 
profession and the realities for young aspirants trying to establish medical careers, a point 4 
we will return to later.[27 ]  5 
 6 
Here we draw on the accounts of practitioners and those managing or observing their 7 
practice to provide an analysis of the contemporary situation of doctors trying to navigate 8 
the changing private healthcare sector in the large urban centres of Maharashtra state - as 9 
employment shifts from practitioner-owned small and medium hospitals to larger 10 
corporatised settings with elaborate management structures. In the first part of the findings 11 
section we document changes in employment and consequent inequality in employment 12 
status. In the second part we explore the implications of managerial and financial pressures 13 
for clinical practices. In the discussion section we highlight the health systems implications 14 
of these findings and consider the implications for the medical profession with reference to 15 
recent sociological work on the changing professions.  16 
 17 
Study setting and context 18 
This study was conducted in two large cities in the Indian state of Maharashtra, which has 19 
an estimated 4,500 hospitals. Mumbai is Maharashtra’s largest city and India’s financial 20 
capital. Pune, the second largest city in the state, is a centre for the IT services industry. 21 
Seen as ‘medical hubs’ for both the country and the state, these cities have seen significant 22 
change in their healthcare systems since independence, characterised by: increasing 23 
pressures on an under-resourced public healthcare system; the emergence of small- and 24 
medium-sized private hospitals; and, most recently, corporatisation trends involving growth 25 
of corporate hospitals, partnering of not-for-profit hospitals with management companies, 26 
and erosion of the small-sized private hospitals.[7] The national context for these changes is 27 
one of fast-growing economic activity in the healthcare sector, enabled by supportive public 28 
policy-making (see Box 1), and including an influx of foreign direct investment estimated at 29 
US Dollars (USD) 6 billion since 2000 and a hospital industry expected to double in value 30 
between 2017 and 2022: from USD 62 billion to USD 133 billion.[28] 31 
 32 
Medical doctors comprise 40% of India’s health workforce, [29] are key players in healthcare 33 
provisioning, and are often considered to be decisive in shaping healthcare practice. 34 
Approximately three-quarters of doctors are allopathic practitioners, the remainder are 35 
trained in ayurvedic and other alternative forms of medicine. Around 64,000 doctors with 36 
Bachelor of Medicine Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) degrees [30] and an overwhelming 37 
majority of students (91%) now wish to pursue a postgraduate specialist degree, [31-32] 38 
however each year only 26,000 manage this.[30] Their training is increasingly being 39 
provided by non-government institutions: according to the now-defunct Medical Council of 40 
India, there were 100 government medical colleges and 10 private medical colleges 41 
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nationally in 1980; by 2019 the number of government schools had doubled while the 1 
number of private medical institutes increased twenty-fold.[33] Subsequent employment 2 
for doctors is concentrated in the private healthcare sector, where 90% of doctors in India 3 
are now based. [34] Some commentators have pointed to the increased opportunities and 4 
monetary benefits offered to doctors by this trend, [22] while others have highlighted 5 
concerns with a system that places significant constraints on clinical practice.[23] There is 6 
widespread concern about unethical conduct, medical negligence, irrational treatment, and 7 
overcharging by India’s private healthcare sector,[24] and frustrations amongst patients and 8 
their families frequently spill over into violence against healthcare workers. There are also 9 
growing calls from alliances of healthcare professionals and civil society for the prioritisation 10 
of ‘ethical’ approaches in healthcare. [35-36] 11 
 12 
Methods 13 
 14 
Data collection and analysis 15 
The data reported here come from a larger mixed-method study on practices, regulations in 16 
and implications of the evolving private healthcare sector in Maharashtra State, India. Semi-17 
structured audio-recorded qualitative interviews were conducted between December 2017 18 
and June 2018 with 43 respondents (Table 1). We sought interviews representing a range of 19 
backgrounds, institutions and viewpoints and respondents were selected using a 20 
combination of purposive and snowball sampling. They were informed of the aims of the 21 
research and the purpose of the interview, and were invited to participate in the research at 22 
a time and place of their choosing. At the time of the interview, respondents were informed 23 
how the data they provided would be managed, asked to complete a consent form, and 24 
informed that they could withdraw their responses from the study at any time up until the 25 
end of the data collection period. Interviews were conducted by two of the authors (SM and 26 
IC), primarily in English but also in Hindi or Marathi as appropriate. Interview questions 27 
related to changes in the practices of workers, patients and managers in the private 28 
healthcare sector. 29 
 30 
An audio-recorded witness seminar, which is a form of group oral history used to document 31 
the history of recent events, was conducted on changes in the private healthcare sector in 32 
Pune and Mumbai since the 1980s. Ten witnesses – senior doctors, hospital managers, 33 
policy-makers and health system researchers – participated in developing an account of 34 
transformations in the sector. Recordings from interviews and witness seminars were 35 
transcribed by contracted assistants and every transcript was checked for accuracy by one 36 
of the authors. Verbatim interview transcripts and the witness seminar transcript were 37 
coded and analysed thematically by two of the authors (SM and IC) with assistance from 38 
Nvivo software [37]. Initial descriptive codes were derived by the whole research team from 39 
a reading of existing literature with additional codes arising from a close reading of the 40 
transcripts and discussion amongst the research team. This was followed by more fine-41 
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grained interpretive coding and analysis. Initial findings from the research were ‘sense-1 
tested’ with project advisors who work in the private healthcare sector in Mumbai and 2 
Pune, and at preliminary dissemination consultations held in Mumbai.  3 
Patient and public involvement 4 
Patients were not involved in the design or management of this research. 5 
 6 
Findings 7 
 8 
Changing healthcare provision and employment opportunity 9 
Respondents highlighted broad trends in employment options in the healthcare sector as 10 
the predominant model of provision has moved from public hospitals, and small and 11 
medium privately owned hospitals (often referred to as ‘nursing homes’) to a burgeoning 12 
corporate sector. In the current period, government employment has dwindling appeal for 13 
many respondents who cited difficult working conditions in urban public hospitals, poor pay 14 
offered in government as compared to most private hospitals, little enthusiasm for postings 15 
to remote and under-equipped facilities, and the public sector’s inability to absorb a 16 
growing number of graduates with specialist training.  17 
 18 
Respondents described a shift in the infrastructure of the private sector away from the 19 
owner-practitioner and towards work in large hospitals either as full-time employees or as 20 
visiting consultants. The opportunities to work in or run a small hospital have been reducing 21 
in recent decades, and a senior surgeon described the low-budget private nursing homes as 22 
‘a dying phenomenon’. Respondents cited the challenges faced by small hospitals. These 23 
include the difficulty for small set-ups to meet all regulatory requirements related to 24 
hospital infrastructure such as separate staircases, overhead tanks and sprinklers in the 25 
premises. They are unable to match the range and sophistication of corporate hospitals’ 26 
services and to meet changing patient aspirations; few are equipped to handle insurance 27 
schemes and lose those patients. For doctor-owners the options are to tie-up with 28 
corporate entities, hand over to a hospital management company or to close down and then 29 
join a corporate hospital as a visiting consultant or ‘panel’ doctor.  30 
 31 
Staffing agencies also now provide doctors - and nurses - ‘on-demand’ to hospitals. It has 32 
become common for new medical graduates to approach such companies for employment.  33 
In order to withstand competition in a crowded field, doctors have also resorted to the use 34 
of online ‘doctor-discovery and booking’ platforms such as Practo, which have emerged in 35 
large cities to enable self-promotion to potential clients. To appear near the top of its list 36 
requires payment of extra charges, but helps increase one’s visibility in the market.   37 
 38 
Doctors in debt  39 
Medical education and the costs of setting up a practice both push doctors into 40 
indebtedness. Increasing numbers of students aspire to do post-graduate specialisation to 41 
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stay competitive in domestic markets, as well as to open opportunities for migration. As 1 
noted above, the number of institutions and places for government training has been 2 
surpassed by private colleges, where many students have to pay hefty admission fees that 3 
are largely unregulated. One respondent noted that fees for training for radiology can cost 4 
the equivalent of USD 100,000, around 17 times higher than in government medical 5 
colleges. A common route for a medical graduate had been to set up a new practice using 6 
family savings or small loans. This path to employment is, however, increasingly difficult. 7 
Any attempt to open one’s own clinic or hospital requires a loan because of the high costs 8 
for land, infrastructure, equipment, and other resources. Some respondents suggested that 9 
all these debts put doctors under pressure to exact maximum financial returns from medical 10 
practice and earn more in order to repay their loans as soon as possible.   11 
 12 
Emerging new forms of employment relations 13 
 Old ways into private practice are thus becoming difficult. As the price of land and 14 
technology has become prohibitively expensive, even the strategy of starting out one’s 15 
practice in a large residential apartment has been undermined by more stringent 16 
enforcement of government building regulations in recent years. On top of this there is a 17 
saturated market for many areas of medical practice in Mumbai and Pune, as one 18 
ophthalmologist noted: ‘when I started to practice in the 1980s, there were about 30-35 19 
ophthalmologists in the city and today the number in Pune is 500 plus.’ This scenario 20 
disadvantages new starters who lack the reputation and client-base of established 21 
practitioners. As a specialist explained, for many doctors now ‘there is no choice but to work 22 
in a big hospital’.  23 
 24 
 For those who do find work in the larger, usually corporate, hospitals, there can be 25 
significant employment benefits on offer including regular pay, access to advanced 26 
technology and infrastructure, and well-trained human resources. Doctors working with 27 
corporate hospitals do not need to make investments nor worry about issues that would 28 
otherwise occupy significant portions of their time as owner-practitioners such as staffing, 29 
administration and renewal of a facility licence. Instead, they can focus on clinical practice. 30 
Some doctors perceive that doctors' attachment to reputed, big hospitals with brand names 31 
also has a positive impact on their patient as big hospitals are assumed to employ the best 32 
doctors. There are personal aspects that are attractive too. Larger hospitals also have 33 
security guards within the hospital premises that provide better protection against violence 34 
from patients. Prestige and credibility is derived from work with a reputed hospital, and 35 
indeed it was noted that young male doctors considered being associated with branded 36 
hospitals as advantageous in attracting a future spouse.  37 
 38 
However, there is widespread precarity in employment conditions in private healthcare, 39 
especially for young, early career doctors. Access to employment in larger hospitals is 40 
limited by the small number of unoccupied posts and hospitals’ preference for doctors 41 
9 
 
trained in alternative medicine who are cheaper to employ and can perform many of the 1 
same tasks. The competition means that many doctors have little control within 2 
employment relations. It was noted by many respondents that managers are able to 3 
terminate the contracts of workers at short notice. Another respondent described being 4 
asked to pay a bond to a hospital that they would receive back only if they stayed at the 5 
hospital for a certain number of years. Those specialities and hospital departments that 6 
generate smaller revenue than expected face a constant struggle to justify their continued 7 
presence in the hospital. In some hospitals full-time contracts are used which prohibit 8 
practising elsewhere, and involve heavy workloads and low pay: described by our 9 
interviewees as ‘exploiting’ doctors and paying ‘pennies’.  10 
 11 
Respondents reported a major disparity in pay between junior and senior doctors in 12 
corporate hospitals. For example, junior doctors may be paid 100,000 rupees per month 13 
(USD 1,400) while senior doctor pay can exceed 10 million rupees per month (USD 140,000). 14 
Given increasing competition and difficulties in practicing as medical doctor, some medical 15 
graduates are opting for different professions. After completing the MBBS, they take a 16 
Masters degree in business administration, law or hospital management and pursue careers 17 
in related industries like pharma, health insurance or the medical devices industry. Further 18 
up the professional hierarchy, with regards to opportunities for senior specialists, as one 19 
doctor respondent commented that ‘Corporates are always behind the big names to get 20 
more business’. Doctors with established reputations often avoid full-time contracts in order 21 
to practise across several hospitals and can generate greater income. For a small number of 22 
such doctors, corporatisation trends have proven very lucrative. The last 20 years have seen 23 
the ascension of the ‘star doctor’: renowned doctors who become a type of celebrity. 24 
Usually surgeons, they can attract wealthy patients, command large fees, hold multiple 25 
appointments across several hospitals, and often appear in the marketing materials. 26 
Respondents noted that hospitals will charge higher fees from patients in order to 27 
accommodate the increased cost of employing ‘star doctors’.  28 
 29 
One member of management staff at a large hospital in Mumbai highlighted the value of 30 
such doctors to hospital marketing teams and the moves made to retain them, revealing 31 
that ‘one senior doctor who gets a lot of VIPs has now become the trustee so that he won't 32 
leave that hospital’. However, another respondent – a surgeon – was unsure how long this 33 
privileged position would continue, arguing that as large hospitals become more established 34 
brands in their own right they will be less reliant on famous doctors and opt to hire cheaper 35 
alternatives.  36 
 37 
Performance targets: ‘Were you not convincing enough?’ 38 
The shift from smaller to larger private providers, and from clinical autonomy to following 39 
standardised plans and protocol as defined by corporate hospitals’ management, is evident. 40 
Opinion on whether it should be viewed as progress differed, with some respondents seeing 41 
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this as replacement of a low-quality market segment by one with greater technology, life-1 
saving capacity and transparent systems. However many saw this as part of a broader shift 2 
away from a patient-oriented healthcare provision towards systems of revenue generation 3 
that, according to one small hospital owner, are ‘faceless, impersonalised and less 4 
accountable’. For these respondents, family practice or small hospitals were much more 5 
connected with their patients. The incursion of commercial considerations into everyday 6 
practice in the form of performance targets was a particular area of concern for our 7 
respondents. Monthly targets for revenue generation or patient throughput are reportedly 8 
set for full-time as well as for visiting consultant and panel doctors at the time of their 9 
appointment. A doctor who misses their targets for two consecutive months receives a 10 
verbal or written memo, and contracts can be terminated if performance against these does 11 
not improve. At times of contract renewal the commercial value of the doctor is assessed on 12 
the revenue they have generated for the hospital.   13 
 14 
Respondents also informed us that the pressure of meeting targets increases as the end of 15 
the month approaches. The success rate of converting outpatients to inpatients by 16 
recommending a procedure or surgical treatment requiring admission has become 17 
significant for the meeting of organisational targets. As a gynaecologist described it, if the 18 
inpatient revenue they generate is proportionately far less than outpatient revenue ‘then 19 
doctors are asked “why is it so? Were you not convincing enough?”’  20 
 21 
Large corporate hospitals build their reputation on the twin selling points of inpatient 22 
‘hospitality’ and of use of advanced technology. This in turn contributes to irrationalities in 23 
medical care as prolonged hospitalisation and large batteries of tests become normalised. 24 
Unnecessary tests are performed to attain the targets needed to ensure the return on the 25 
purchase of costly equipment: ‘Because of targets, machines require 1,000 patients or 26 
investigations per month. So, it definitely involves a lot of unnecessary investigations, a lot of 27 
treatment modalities’ (Ophthalmologist). This situation is compounded by growing use of 28 
private insurance to pay for healthcare and attitudes that see this insurance as legitimising 29 
irrational provision of care. 30 
 31 
As our respondents acknowledged, financial imperatives are not new to the private sector in 32 
India, nor are they unique to larger hospitals, as smaller private providers also have to 33 
remain financially viable. However, the point was made that targets in small hospitals are 34 
limited to the owner-doctor’s requirements for meeting loan repayments and are not 35 
individually applied in that way to other doctors attached to it.  36 
 37 
Participation in networks of cash-for-referrals, referred to as ‘cut practices’ has been 38 
longstanding within Maharashtra’s healthcare system, encouraged by the financial strains 39 
on smaller private providers. Now the incentives are for practitioners to by-pass smaller 40 
hospitals and refer their patients to specialists in the larger, corporate hospitals in search of 41 
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more substantial commissions. In the words of one gynaecologist: ‘since the corporate bill is 1 
much bigger even the crumbs are bigger’. Respondents explained that refusal to engage in 2 
paying cash for referrals could prove particularly detrimental to younger doctors without an 3 
established reputation and who might otherwise struggle to attract patients, impacting in 4 
turn on their ability to repay debts.  5 
 6 
‘Doctors are pawns’  7 
While doctors’ pay and conditions seem generally better in larger, corporate hospitals than 8 
in smaller private facilities, there are accompanying behavioural expectations and significant 9 
reductions in autonomy for medical professionals. The growth of a healthcare management 10 
cadre is evident in burgeoning management departments, new managerial posts such as 11 
operating officers, executives, and supervisors, and the widespread incorporation of 12 
business practices. Most managerial staff are the products of business management training 13 
institutions. Respondents felt these staff prioritised financial concerns of their institution 14 
over the realities of healthcare - in ways that left one urologist comparing such hospitals to 15 
patient ‘factories’. The comment from a retired state health official that ‘doctors are pawns, 16 
they are supposed to be the conduit to earn money’, reflects a commonly voiced cynicism 17 
about the healthcare industry and its ways of working. Doctors also felt they must 18 
accommodate the priorities of hospital managers, as one radiologist noted: "if you want to 19 
work with corporates you have to have a certain mindset… in short you have to keep the 20 
management happy." Senior consultants can express resistance to management decisions 21 
but do not have a ‘deciding say’ in the running of the hospital. Junior doctors have even less 22 
opportunity to do so. 23 
 24 
The division of labour within wards in corporate hospitals allows little time for patient 25 
interaction with senior doctors as the majority of care is provided by junior doctors and 26 
nursing staff. This results in a loss of status: ‘Patients interact with doctor as if doctor is the 27 
employee of the hospital and hence should give the services’ (Gynaecologist). The growing 28 
use of standard treatment protocols introduced by hospitals and by health insurers was felt 29 
by many to be an additional constraint on professional autonomy. While some felt this 30 
helped to standardise prices and improve transparency for hospital bills, other respondents 31 
noted that it further eroded the autonomy of healthcare workers in providing discretionary 32 
fee waivers to patients considered unable to otherwise pay. 33 
 34 
Discussion  35 
The analysis in this article aims to understand the experiences of doctors who are navigating 36 
a changing scenario of private healthcare delivery in Mumbai and Pune, as seen through 37 
their own eyes and those interacting with them. The specificity of our sampling allowed for 38 
valuable in-depth data collection but is also a limitation. First, our findings do not include 39 
the views of doctors who work only in the government facilities. Second, while our findings 40 
are likely to have salience in settings where similar structural changes are taking place 41 
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medical education and employment, the plausibility of their applicability to other groups 1 
and settings needs to take into account contextual differences. 2 
 3 
Some of the accompanying shifts taking place in public healthcare institutions have been the 4 
subject of earlier research [38], and our focus here on the private healthcare sector comes 5 
at a time of renewed national and subnational policy interest in the expansion of insurance 6 
financing and private provision for healthcare [39]. We found the in-depth qualitative 7 
interviews suitable for generating personal accounts on changes in private healthcare 8 
delivery and almost all respondents agreed to audio-recording. We also wished to set these 9 
within the backdrop of the recent history of the sector, and we found the witness seminar 10 
technique particularly useful for bringing together a collective narration of contemporary 11 
events that were not well documented elsewhere.[40]  12 
 13 
Our findings suggest several dimensions for understanding the contradictions affecting 14 
medical professionals navigating a shifting employment scenario in the contemporary 15 
private healthcare sector in India. Here we discuss these in relation to relevant other 16 
literature. 17 
 18 
1. Significant re-structuring of employment for doctors 19 
Study respondents point to a notable shift taking place in the avenues for doctors’ training 20 
and employment. Earlier models of either employment by government colleges and 21 
hospitals, or being a small or medium hospital owner or a solo practitioner are declining, 22 
while the trend of doctors working within corporate hospitals is increasing. This is borne out 23 
by other reports. [41-42] Corporate hospitals have indeed become a favoured destination 24 
for doctors' employment. Our findings suggest factors which are pulling the doctors towards 25 
the corporate hospitals and pushing them away from the small hospitals and public 26 
healthcare system, and point to the reduced choices for young and early career doctors 27 
beyond joining corporate hospitals. This is not confined to Maharashtra - reports from the 28 
south of India also indicate the shutting down of smaller clinics as doctors take offers of 29 
higher pay in corporate hospitals with which small facilities cannot compete.[43]  30 
 31 
2. Consequent changes in doctors’ relationship with their patients  32 
An erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship has been noted in studies from India 33 
and other LMICs.[44-45] Other studies have also shown that the perception of malpractice 34 
by the doctor for financial gain, or the impression that the doctor has neglected their duty 35 
towards patients and relatives are important contributors to aggression, leading to violence 36 
against doctors.[46] In healthcare the inter-relations of systems trust and personal trust are 37 
complex. [45] In the context of the USA, commentators have for some time noted tensions 38 
between practitioner self-interest and notions of ‘collective altruism’ to serve the needs of 39 
patients, and the shift away from earlier paternalistic relationships towards more 40 
consumerist relationships.[47]. 41 
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 1 
What our findings suggest is that doctor-patient relationships in the context of private 2 
healthcare in India are being influenced by three inter-related trends: changes in attitudes 3 
of doctors, practices in a corporatising hospital sector and aspirations among patients. Until 4 
the 1980s medical practice was dominated by general practitioners and family physicians, 5 
where the doctor-patient relationship was personalised with an assurance of continuity of 6 
care. Information asymmetry meant patients were open to exploitation and unnecessary 7 
intervention, but as doctors were paid by individual families, this provided a degree of self-8 
regulation due to a need to maintain a web of social networks and trust of patients. The 9 
transaction between the private general practitioner and patient, though commercial in 10 
nature was thus also relational and socially embedded.  11 
 12 
Our respondents’ accounts suggest that corporate healthcare chains with aggressive 13 
marketing to develop client pools are operating as an explicitly commercial and socially dis-14 
embedded enterprise, and that their business practices exacerbate the risk of over-15 
intervention. The corporate chains are part of a ‘medical-industrial complex’ that brings 16 
together the medical profession, politicians, religious organisations, financial capital, real 17 
estate, insurance and other non-health industries, and which is influential in public policy 18 
processes for pharmaceuticals, medical devices and healthcare provisioning.[20, 42,48] 19 
 20 
As doctors are paid by the corporate hospitals and not directly by patients, this also changes 21 
the patient’s relationship with their doctor. The focus of our study was not patients, but our 22 
doctor interviewees described how, with reduction in the number of small hospitals,[41] the 23 
corporate hospitals’ empanelment with insurance companies, and the widespread publicity 24 
around high technology interventions, upper-middle-class patients’ preferences have 25 
gradually shifted from having a known and trusted doctor to the well-equipped, corporate 26 
hospitals with hotel-style facilities. These then set the aspirations of others.  27 
 28 
3. An emerging re-professionalisation and re-stratification 29 
For our final point we return to consider Starr’s suggestion that increasing corporate 30 
influence over the rules and standards of medical work engender ‘perhaps the most subtle 31 
loss of autonomy for the profession’ [1] and how this is enacted in India. The literature 32 
suggests that the behaviours of other large health industries including insurance, 33 
pharmaceuticals and medical technology are all contributing in different ways to reduced 34 
autonomy within medical practice.[49-51] Our findings indicate that the level of doctors’ 35 
individual autonomy diminishes as their stake in the ownership of the private facility 36 
reduces, from operating their own practice or facility to working in a corporate hospital. As 37 
a result of corporate involvement, the medical profession in India is also now increasingly 38 
subject to new forms of management with new ways of thinking about the business of 39 
medicine. Doctors report finding their clinical decision-making swayed by employer-40 
imposed targets and driven by institutional and personal needs to ensure financial returns. 41 
14 
 
The performance targets imposed on doctors in this system further encourage malpractices 1 
such as exaggerated diagnoses and unnecessary therapeutic procedures,[24] and patients 2 
pay the price of undergoing unwarranted procedures and inflated costs of healthcare. These 3 
are experiences that resonate with those of doctors in other, wealthier countries. [12,52]  4 
 5 
Doctors are not, of course, one homogenous group. Middle-level doctors in private 6 
healthcare are paid well but are given performance targets in return which directly intrude 7 
upon their professional autonomy. Young doctors at the start of their careers are in an even 8 
weaker position, often overworked and paid less. Such changes when observed in wealthy 9 
countries were interpreted by early researchers as de-professionalisation – the loss of 10 
professionals’ autonomy and power to managers or consumers [52] – or even 11 
proletarianisation – a total loss of control over the conditions of work, as well as a severe 12 
reduction in compensation. [1] However, recently sociologists have elaborated a more 13 
complex reading of the processes they were observing, describing these as re-14 
professionalisation: where professional practices, identities and boundaries are re-defined 15 
by the expectations of corporations, managers and customers, [53] and re-stratification: the 16 
reordering of power within professions with the emergence of new professional elites and 17 
new hybrids which in other settings have often combined medical and managerial roles.[54-18 
55, 51-52]  19 
 20 
These definitions elaborated by Waring [56] provide a useful frame for our findings, which 21 
suggest that a process of re-professionalisation is occurring within private medical practice 22 
in India in which changing forms of status, power and inequality have resulted from new 23 
expectations and pressures from the corporations, managers and service users of the 24 
private healthcare sector. A re-ordering of power can also be seen at the intra-professional 25 
level as the balance shifts away from senior general practitioners towards specialists and 26 
super specialist-professional elites working in the corporate hospital sector. This 27 
exacerbates historical stratifications based on class and caste, as differences in who can 28 
enter the prestigious medical schools and afford postgraduate speciality training carry 29 
through into employment opportunities. The extent of the contemporary high profile for 30 
the ‘star doctor’ or ‘super doctor’ is perhaps peculiar to India,[57] and may be understood 31 
as the emergence of a new professional elite that is a hybrid of medical practitioner, 32 
businessman and celebrity philanthropist.  33 
 34 
Conclusion  35 
 36 
It has been noted by other researchers from LMICs [15-16] and high-income countries 37 
[1,8,13-14,57], that the changing, and increasingly global, healthcare industry has significant 38 
implications for doctors and for their practice. In India, tensions are being felt by medical 39 
professionals with regards to opportunities and challenges in the contemporary healthcare 40 
system where growing public policy emphasis on private healthcare provision and on 41 
15 
 
insurance modes of financing feeds into corporatisation processes. This empirical study 1 
contributes to understanding the effects of corporatisation of healthcare on doctors in 2 
middle-income countries like India. We evidence three interrelated processes of re-3 
structuring, re-professionalisation and re-stratification which can be observed in this 4 
context and which have been occasioned or exacerbated by corporates’ practices. 5 
 6 
The case study from Maharashtra reveals an ongoing re-professionalisation within the 7 
private medical sector encompassing changes in employment relations through the advent 8 
of corporate hospitals, personal indebtedness, performance targets and constraints placed 9 
on professional autonomy, and accompanied by trends in cost inflation, medical 10 
malpractice, and distrust in doctor-patient relationships. Contiguously, a  re-stratification 11 
taking place within India’s medical profession is one which appears to favour senior hospital 12 
specialists and ‘star doctors’ who contribute to the corporates’ brands and patient 13 
recruitment while the status of senior general practitioners has diminished. Our findings 14 
suggest that a new section of the medical fraternity with elite status holds authority and is 15 
able to maintain strategic positions in this situation, while a decline in status and autonomy 16 
is being experienced by a large section of doctors especially by those commencing their 17 
careers.  18 
 19 
Overall, professional practices, identities and boundaries are being redefined by the 20 
expectations of corporate healthcare providers, their managers and their users. This raises 21 
important questions about the role that government and medical professionals’ bodies can 22 
and should play in such a scenario where the potential for ‘collective altruism’ is being 23 
actively eroded.   24 
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